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1. Introduction: From Collective Security to International Peacekeeping
The United Nations was founded in the aftermath of the Second World War on the dream
that through cooperation, mutual respect, and if necessary, military intervention to block an
aggressor, the international community could avoid plunging into another devastating war. At the
Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Allied leaders Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin
envisioned a system of collective security for the postwar, by which the three Great Powers
would cooperate to quell a breach of the peace in any part of the world.1 The collective security
paradigm was embedded into the Charter of the United Nations, which charged five Great
Powers, France and China added to the Allied victors, with the primary responsibility for
carrying out the principal mandate of the UN, “to maintain international peace and security.”2
Each of the Great Powers maintained the power of veto within the UN Security Council, such
that unanimous agreement among them was required for the body to act.
The Charter’s collective security system, however, faltered at the inception of the United
Nations, and its breakdown became one of the fateful stories of the early Cold War. As the EastWest divide became entrenched, the Soviet Union relied increasingly on its veto power to thwart
Western interests in the Security Council, undercutting the hope for cooperation among the Great
Powers.3 Given that the United States and the Soviet Union would never collaborate on any
security matter vital to the interests of either power, there emerged over the first decade of the
United Nations several new modes of international conflict management that avoided the need
for military cooperation among the Great Powers. In May 1948, responding to hostilities
between a newly created Israel and its Arab neighbors, the Security Council authorized the
1
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United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which would become the first peace
observation mission. UNTSO consisted of several hundred lightly armed troops, under the
command of UN Mediator Folke Bernadotte, charged to observe the compliance of Israel and the
Arab states with the Armistice Agreements which had set the demarcation lines between the
warring parties. However, the peace observers were instructed to remain neutral and could only
report breaches of the Armistice lines to the equally ineffective Mixed Armistice Commissions;
were violence to break out, the observers were instructed to step aside.4 As an opposite means of
United Nations involvement, the Security Council authorized a military intervention during the
Korean War, calling upon Member States to provide military assistance to the Republic of
Korea. However, the enabling resolution for the operation was only passed due to the Soviet
Union’s boycott of Security Council meetings. In practice, the intervention in Korea became a
United States military operation, established only under the guise of the United Nations.5
The Suez crisis of October 1956 marked a pivotal point in the role of the United Nations
in maintaining international security, and led to the inception of peacekeeping as an innovative
and effective paradigm. Relations between Egypt and the West had become strained since the
rise to power of Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser, whose strong nationalist sentiments and close ties
to the Soviet Union elicited the fear of U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and British
Prime Minister Anthony Eden. Nasser sparked an international crisis when in July 1956, when
after the United States and Britain had withdrawn funding for the Aswan High Dam project, he
nationalized the Suez Canal, previously under the ownership of the privately held Suez Canal
Company. Eden immediately favored a military intervention in Egypt, as a means to protect
British interests in the Canal and to depose of Nasser, while Dulles and President Eisenhower
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rejected a military solution. The British chose to proceed without the support of the United
States; following a series of ostensible diplomatic maneuvers, by which the British and French
proposed a power-sharing arrangement that Nasser readily rejected, Britain and France formed a
covert pact with Israel in order to regain control of the Canal.6
On October 29, the Israeli military invaded the Sinai Peninsula, motivated by the
imperative to advance its own security position against terrorist raids from Egypt. The following
day, as planned, the British and French issued an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel, demanding that
both withdraw their militaries within a ten-mile radius of the Canal and allow Anglo-French
troops to temporarily occupy the Canal zone. Naturally, Nasser rejected the ultimatum, which
demanded that Egypt relinquish its authority to defend its own territory, and on October 31 the
British and French commenced a bombing campaign over Egyptian territory. UN SecretaryGeneral Dag Hammarskjöld brought the crisis before the Security Council on October 30,
whereby the United States proposed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of the Anglo-FrenchIsraeli forces. Britain and France vetoed the resolution, as well as a subsequent, less extensive
resolution put forth by the Soviet Union, ensuring that the Security Council could not fulfill its
mandate to maintain international security.7 Immobilized, the Security Council voted to transfer
the Suez question to the General Assembly under the 1950 Uniting for Peace resolution,8 by
which an urgent security matter could be transferred to the Assembly were a permanent member
to block action in the Security Council.9
The Assembly faced a daunting challenge, on which hinged the reputation of the United
Nations. Never before had the Assembly been called upon to consider a matter of immanent
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security; and further, two of the aggressors were members of the very elite group entrusted with
the maintenance of international peace. The Assembly did not have the authority under the
Charter to authorize military enforcement actions against the aggressors, and the United States
would not condone an operation against its allies; but peace observation had failed to provide
any stability in the Middle East over the previous eight years and could not serve as viable model
now that hostilities had again flared. Over the course of a ten-day Emergency Special Session
and through a series of negotiations conducted by the Secretary-General, the Assembly created
the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the first UN peacekeeping operation, which
inaugurated the set of principles that have come to define peacekeeping as a paradigm.
Peacekeeping, broadly conceived, is a strategy by which a neutral international force is
deployed to create a buffer zone between two hostile parties, with the consent of the country on
whose territory the force is stationed, in order to supervise a previously concluded cease-fire. A
peacekeeping mission lacks the invasive character of a military enforcement operation, which
intervenes on a specific side of a conflict, but it has greater authority than a peace observation
mission, in that it maintains a physical bulwark between the disputants.10 Historian Alan James
distinguishes the model of peacekeeping by four characteristics: the personnel are of a military
nature; they are of neutral status and may only shoot in self-defense; they are placed to “diffuse
tensions in areas of crisis”; and the operation is established by a legitimate international body.11
Several further principles came to distinguish peacekeeping as it was conceived during the Suez
crisis, including the nonparticipation of the Great Powers, which would not risk an adversary’s
involvement in a peacekeeping operation, and the nonpolitical nature of the operation, in the
sense that the presence of the force would not be contingent on the negotiation of a long-term
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political settlement. The core tenet of a peacekeeping operation became the consent of the host
country on whose territory foreign troops would be stationed.
The purpose of this paper is to trace the evolution of the concept of peacekeeping during
the formation of UNEF and to examine how United Nations leaders arrived at the basic
principles that would come to define peacekeeping as a unique and viable paradigm for curtailing
local conflicts. In particular, I seek to assess the relative importance of immediate politicomilitary considerations and long-term, precedential legal considerations in the establishment of
the force. First, I consider the particular roles of Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and the
Canadian delegate Lester Person, the most central diplomats in the formation of UNEF. Then, I
discuss the development of the principles that came to define peacekeeping through a detailed
examination of the Assembly’s First Emergency Special Session and the Secretary-General’s
negotiations with the government of Egypt, covering the period through the deployment of the
first UNEF troops in the Canal area. I conclude with a summary of the major trends during the
formation of UNEF and a discussion of how a precedential framework for peacekeeping grew
out of an operation formed largely ad hoc.

2. Hammarskjöld and Pearson: The Visionaries of Peacekeeping
Every account of the formation of UNEF regards two figures as central. Dag
Hammarskjöld of Sweden had assumed the post of Secretary-General in 1953 and became
known for his diplomatic tact. Hammarskjöld had become involved in the Suez crisis in early
October, when he worked with the British, French, and Egyptian governments to draft a Security
Council resolution outlining six principles for resolving the dispute,12 and he recognized that the
reputation of the UN hinged on securing the cessation of violence in Egypt. On October 31,
12
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Hammarskjöld announced before the Security Council his view that the Secretary-General must
remain loyal to the principles embodied in the Charter, which transcend the policies of individual
Member States, and he quickly gained the trust of the parties to the crisis.13 Ambassador Lester
Pearson of Canada arrived in New York on November 1 and quickly became the leading
proponent of an emergency international force.14 Pearson recognized the dangerous rift the crisis
had opened between Britain and the United States;15 he sought a means to reconcile Canada’s
closest allies, as well as to enable Britain to save face and obtain a reasonable settlement to the
Canal dispute.16
The official account of the formation of UNEF holds that the idea for an emergency
international force was initially advanced by Ambassador Pearson, upon which the concept was
brought to fruition by the extraordinary insight and tact of Secretary-General.17 While this
description is true, it is critical to distinguish between the model of peacekeeping Pearson
proposed and championed throughout the early debates and the framework actually established
by Hammarskjöld. Though they worked closely, Pearson and Hammarskjöld personify the great
tension that defined the formation of UNEF. Pearson throughout emphasized the precedential
nature of the operation and the need to establish a system of foundational principles such that the
paradigm of peacekeeping could be employed in future conflicts. Hammarskjöld remained a
pragmatist, focused on the imminent political realities of the Suez crisis, and he consistently
favored negotiation and compromise over asserting matters of broad principle. Ultimately
Hammarskjöld established the force on an ad hoc basis, through days of talks with the parties to
the conflict and potential contributors to the force, and his personal diplomacy forms much of the
13
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story of the creation of UNEF. Throughout, however, he carried out his duties in opposition to
the model of peacekeeping Pearson defended.
In seeking to create a force that could secure a cease-fire in Egypt and regain the prestige
of the United Nations, Hammarskjöld was called upon to reconcile the demands of three
competing blocs. The majority of Member States, backed by the critical support of the United
States, sought to establish a force that would supervise a cessation of violence and a withdrawal
of the invading powers, without offering political gains to the aggressors. While the focus of the
General Assembly remained political, the Member States also sought to establish an adequate
legal basis for their actions consistent with the principles, though not the letter, of the Charter.18
The Assembly’s resolutions expanded the body’s power beyond its Charter functions,
sufficiently such as to create a neutral, quasi-military force, but without encroaching on the
military enforcement functions of the Security Council. Hammarskjöld throughout viewed his
own legal status as determined by the Assembly resolutions; the legal authority for his diplomacy
and for the peacekeeping mission he created stemmed from the principles put forth by the
Assembly.
Further, Hammarskjöld was forced to confront the demands of Britain, France, and Israel,
which refused to comply immediately with the Assembly resolutions. The legal principles
asserted by the Assembly were nonbinding, given that the Assembly has no authority to enforce
its resolutions; thus, the demands of the aggressors forced Hammarskjöld to deviate from the
conception of the Force as envisioned by the Assembly to conform to the reality of AngloFrench-Israeli intransigence. Pearson remained closer to the British position than to the
American, so that while he remained most concerned with establishing a set of precedential
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principles for peacekeeping, he often found himself arguing against the legal framework that had
been established by the Assembly.
Finally, and especially after the conclusion of the Emergency Special Session,
Hammarskjöld carried out extensive negotiations with the government of Egypt, which harbored
suspicions of a force composed of foreign powers stationed on its soil. Egypt ultimately
possessed little choice in its decision to accept the force, as this presented the only means to
ensure the withdrawal of Britain and France. 19 Nevertheless, Egypt’s demands, especially with
regard to the issue of “consent,” served to shape the principles on which UNEF would be
founded.

3. The First Emergency Special Session
The First General Assembly Emergency Special Session, at which the basic structure of
UNEF was determined, convened on the evening of November 1, amidst a tense political
climate. Cold War tensions loomed large, as the Soviet Union had already threatened to
intervene on the side of Egypt,20 while the United States was forced to choose whether to support
its Western allies or its few remaining friends in the Arab world. The concept of an international
force to be stationed between the Egyptian and Israeli troops was first proposed by the British
delegate Pearson Dixon, who sought to secure a political advantage for his country; but as British
policy came under attack from the Assembly’s third world majority and, more significantly, from
the United States, the framework for a peacekeeping operation diverged significantly from its
initial conception. The extended General Assembly session witnessed competing visions of what
an international peacekeeping force would entail, which clashed with each other and ultimately
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had to be reconciled with the reality of the situation on the ground. The emergency session saw
the inception of many of the principles that have come to define U.N. peacekeeping, as well as a
dramatic expansion of the role of the Secretary-General and the Assembly itself.

The Opening Meetings: Beyond Charter Norms
As the 1956 Emergency Session was the first General Assembly convened under the
Uniting for Peace Resolution, the Assembly faced fundamental questions about the nature and
scope of its authority as it sought to diffuse the violence. The first and most basic question to
surface was that of the legal status of the parties involved. While the British and French
delegates offered a specious defense of their countries’ actions, it was quickly accepted by the
majority that the invasion of the Sinai constituted an unprovoked act of aggression against a
Member State, and that Egypt thereby possessed the legitimate right to self-defense under Article
51 of the Charter. Several delegates recognized the broader contexts of the crisis, including the
failure of the United Nations over the previous eight years to work out a long term solution to the
Middle East conflict and more immediately, the entitlement of the British and French to
compensation for their loss of the Canal.21 However, as explicitly stated in Article 2 of the
Charter, and in accordance with every principle presumed to govern the postwar international
order, such conflicts were to be resolved peacefully and not through military aggression.22 The
invasion of Egypt was unjustifiable, and, if condoned, would set a precedent for the use of force
as a legitimate means for attaining political objectives.
Given that the invasion of Egypt constituted a breach of the peace, the Assembly
possessed the right under the 1950 resolution to “[make] appropriate recommendations to

21
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Members for collective measures, including… the use of armed force when necessary, to
maintain or restore international peace and security.”23 However, the extent of the Assembly’s
authority in responding to the present crisis was not immediately obvious. The Arab bloc, backed
by the Soviet Union, maintained the most extreme position, arguing for the explicit
condemnation of the invading forces and the application of sanctions against Israel. Ambassador
Rafik Asha of Syria argued for the application of compulsory military force if the aggressors
failed to comply with a resolution of the Assembly.24 However, the Arab position conflicted with
the legal parameters of the situation. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, only the Security
Council has the authority to authorize the use of force against an aggressor, so neither
compulsory force nor sanctions could be legally adopted as means to end the violence.25
Ultimately the general view was accepted that the Assembly did not have the authority to
mandate the use of force or sanctions against the aggressors, outside the legitimate right to selfdefense of Article 51, and that the Assembly would not seek to condemn them.
However it was clear that some action, if not compulsory, had to be taken in response to
the crisis. The most contentious debate during the early negotiations centered on whether the
Assembly would only seek an end to the immediate violence, or whether the Assembly would
take action to advance a political solution to the underlying tensions that had caused the crisis.
Three general views were expressed on this question, divided along political lines. The ArabAsian and Soviet blocs offered the narrowest interpretation of the Emergency Session’s mandate,
holding that its only purpose was to bring about an immediate end to the violence in Egypt.
These delegates argued that the long-term security situation of the Middle East was irrelevant to
the present task of the Assembly. Rather, they held that the British, French, and Israelis should
21
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be condemned by the United Nations, and they discounted any Egyptian responsibility for the
crisis. Most of the Latin American countries, and eventually the United States, emphasized that
the United Nations was responsible not only for quelling the immediate violence, but for also for
helping the parties to reach a long-term settlement. However, this group believed that it would
only make sense to consider the long-term questions after the situation on the ground had
stabilized, and thus it saw the securing of a cease-fire as the distinctive priority of the Emergency
Session. Finally, Britain, France, and the former British Commonwealth states held that the
imperative for a long-term security arrangement could not be divorced from the current
emergency, so any UN action should contain measures that would facilitate a settlement to longterm political questions. Eden believed that the current crisis had arisen out of years of
instability, and that the Anglo-French intervention might lead to a permanent Arab-Israeli
settlement and an international agreement on the use of the Canal.26 Dixon argued at the
Assembly that given the inability of the United Nations over the previous eight years to bring
about a stable situation in the Middle East, another round of ineffectual resolutions would be “of
temporary value at best” and would only delay the next Arab-Israeli war.27 Pearson, accepting
the British view, told the Assembly that the current crisis presented “the opportunity to link a
cease-fire to the absolute necessity of a political settlement.”28
In the most critical development of the crisis, the United States government chose to take
the moderate stance, holding that peace should precede a long-term settlement, rather than the
position of its West European allies. The decision of Eisenhower and Dulles has been attributed
to aggravation with the governments of Britain, France, and Israel, which had defied their
traditional deference to U.S. leadership by moving forward with the invasion without informing
26
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Washington.29 The U.S. leadership also feared driving the newly created Arab and Asian nations
toward the Soviet Union,30 and as such Dulles sought to preempt Soviet involvement in the
conflict.31 The draft resolution Dulles brought before the Assembly, which would become
Assembly Resolution 997, garnered the support of the majority of Member States and ensured
that Britain’s aims would not be realized. The U.S. resolution noted, without condemnation, that
the actions of the invading powers were in violation of international law. It urged the immediate
establishment of a cease-fire, the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines, and a halt
on the movement of arms to the area of conflict, without prescribing steps toward a long-term
political settlement. The only long-term provision of the Resolution urged that “steps be taken to
reopen the Suez Canal,” and then only after a cease-fire had been reached.32
As the United States sought only to curtail the actions of the aggressors, without
advancing a political solution, the initial idea for an international force to intervene in the region
came from within the British bloc. Eden first proposed the concept of United Nations police
force before the House of Commons on November 2,33 and Dixon and then Pearson brought the
idea before the Assembly. As such, the force was initially conceived as an extension of British
political aims. Eden hoped that an international force would inspire world confidence in the
attainment of a lasting Arab-Israeli peace and permanent freedom of passage through the Suez
Canal.34 Dixon advanced the notion of an international police force by claiming that the British
had intervened in Suez in the first place only to safeguard the Canal and the security of the
region.35 Thus the Anglo-French force already served as a type of peacekeeping operation
29
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between the hostile Egyptians and Israelis, and it could eventually be replaced by an
international force.36 Pearson, the most prominent proponent of an international operation at the
Assembly session, argued that such a force would “keep the borders at peace while a political
settlement is being worked out.”37
Pearson’s vision and persistence between the start of the crisis and the next Assembly
meeting on November 3 led to the official proposal for an international force. Pearson composed
a draft resolution, with the significant input of the U.S. delegate Henry Cabot Lodge, which
contained the idea of an emergency international force.38 Pearson had obtained the support of
Hammarskjöld, after Secretary-General had learned that British, French, and Israelis would not
obey the exhortations of Resolution 997, as well as the support of the delegate from India, an
influential member of the Arab-Asia bloc.39 Pearson was forced to set aside his support for the
British position, in order to advance a resolution that would remain consistent with U.S. policy
and obtain the support of a majority in the General Assembly. Pearson’s draft resolution, which
became Assembly Resolution 998, ignored long-term political questions, proposing an
international force only to oversee compliance with the terms of Resolution 997. His resolution
was followed by Resolution 999, proposed by nineteen Asian and Arab countries, which
reiterated the call for a cease-fire and withdrawal. Thus, from its formal conception, UNEF was
envisioned as an operation meant to ensure compliance with the terms already dictated by the
Assembly; it was not itself to become a factor in shaping a long-term peace settlement, nor even
to maintain security while such a settlement was negotiated.

36
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The Canadian resolution represented a definitive shift away from the Charter spirit of
collective security and the dream that the superpowers would collaborate to guard a new order of
international peace. The peacekeeping force would not defend a Member State against an
aggressor but would only “secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities”40 in accordance with
the Assembly’s previous resolution. Moreover, the international force would operate “with the
consent of the countries concerned,”41 although the nature of that consent was to become the
most crucial point of contention during the establishment of the operation. The legality of such a
force was not questioned, however, because the functions stipulated in the resolution remained
short of the peace enforcement measures that could only be authorized by the Security Council,
and because the United States and the Soviet Union both supported the narrower view of the
emergency force. The pending question remained whether the authority of such a mission could
extend beyond the vague and limiting terms of Resolution 998, and whether Britain and her allies
still maintained sufficient political clout to continue to advance the idea of a long-range,
politically-motivated operation.
Most importantly, the Canadian resolution entailed an expansion of the functions of the
Secretary-General from the administrative role envisioned in the Charter to an active diplomatic
role. Resolution 998 conferred upon the Secretary-General complete authority to set up the
framework and parameters for the operation, and it requested that Hammarskjöld submit a plan
within forty-eight hours for the establishment of an emergency international force. It would have
become cumbersome and politically unfeasible to attempt to reach a consensus among Assembly
members on matters of detail, while Hammarskjöld already commanded the trust of the global
diplomatic community. Indeed, it has been argued that Resolution 998 was above all a statement

40
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of faith in the “objectivity and prestige” of Hammarskjöld, who was alone entrusted to organize a
viable force.42

Hammarskjöld’s Reports on the Force
In accordance with Resolution 998, Hammarskjold presented his first report on the plan
for an emergency international force on the evening of November 4, opening a new phase in the
Emergency Special Session in which the principles of peacekeeping were formally inaugurated.
The fourth paragraph of Hammarskjöld’s report, which would become the basis for Assembly
Resolution 1000, established the basic terms on which UNEF would operate. General E.L.M.
Burns, the Chief of Command of UNTSO, was appointed as chief of the emergency international
force and charged to recruit officers and troops from Member States. The Secretary-General was
to maintain administrative oversight over the mission.43
Importantly, Hammarskjöld’s report specified that no permanent member of the Security
Council be permitted to submit troops for the force; the force would be comprised of middle and
smaller powers only. This foundational principle originated in part from the politics of the Suez
crisis and in part from the larger contexts of the Cold War. Both the American and Soviet
governments rejected British and French participation in the force, consistent with their rejection
of the Anglo-French position throughout the crisis. Thus, Hammarskjöld was able to proceed
with his view of a politically independent force by prohibiting the participation of the parties to
the conflict. Moreover, U.S. leaders feared that Soviet participation would shift the tenuous
balance of influence in the Middle East, especially as the Eastern bloc had already been engaged
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in arms deals with Nasser since September 1955.44 Finally, the Soviet government itself,
preoccupied with anti-communist demonstrations in Hungary, remained wary of becoming
embroiled in a Middle East conflict.45 The shift to peacekeeping by small powers, which was to
become a basic model for future operations, represents a further departure from the collective
security vision. A force comprised of contingencies from small powers was the only view that
could be accepted by both superpowers, whose support was essential for the establishment of
UNEF.
Hammarskjöld’s report also presented an important ambiguity as to the scope of the
force. In discussing the basic parameters of the force, Hammarskjöld recommended that the force
be established to “secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the
terms” of Resolution 997, restricting the functions of the force to the limited conception favored
by the Arab-Asia bloc. 46 However, the report went on to distinguish between two stages of the
force, a first stage corresponding to the functions outlined in Resolution 997, but a second stage
corresponding to “efforts of a longer range.”47 Hammarskjöld, then, did not seek to limit the
functions of the emergency force, or to prematurely speculate on its functions in the long term.
Ever a pragmatist, he preferred to quickly establish a viable force on the ground, and later to
resolve the details of its eventual functions.
Finally, the Assembly debates on Hammarskjöld’s first report clarified the principle of
consent, established in Resolution 998, which would become the critical factor distinguishing
peacekeeping from peace enforcement. The Israeli delegate Abba Eban noted the failure of the
Secretary’s report to explicate the necessity of consent of the host country, fearing that the
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Assembly would be empowered to place an international force on Israeli territory without
Israel’s prior approval.48 The Colombian delegate Francisco Urrutia responded that the consent
of the host country was an obvious requirement of international law, unquestioned by any nation,
but that the legitimate territory under jurisdiction of a sovereign state did not include that
acquired by the use of force. The government of Israel could not claim sovereign status over the
territory conquered in the invasion of the Sinai and could not legitimately deny a peacekeeping
mission access to this territory.49 Thus, the peacekeeping operation would not have the
enforcement authority of Chapter VII measures, but if supported by the two great superpowers, it
would not cower to the military acquisitions of an aggressor.
On the morning of November 7, after intensive consultations with Pearson and other
delegates, the Secretary-General presented before the Assembly his second and final report on
the plan for UNEF, approved later that day in Resolution 1001.50 The Secretary-General
remained cognizant that his authority to set up an international force was derived solely from the
resolutions of the Assembly, and thus he based his proposals on the legal framework created by
the four resolutions. The report envisioned a politically independent force, one that would derive
its authority solely from the resolutions of the Assembly. 51 This principle was not only necessary
as a political measure, to prevent the force from becoming a subordinate of the invading powers,
but also to uphold the principles of Resolution 998, which charged the Secretary-General, not a
particular Member State, to submit a plan for the force. Most critically, Hammarskjöld’s report
rejected the Anglo-French proposal to assign responsibility for the force to a single country or
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small group of countries, which would carry out the purposes of the United Nations; rather, the
force and its commander would be responsible directly to the Assembly.52
The Secretary-General’s second report also reopened the question of the scope of the
operation. Britain and her allies continued to view the UN force as an operation which would
take over the functions of the present Anglo-French “peacekeeping” mission, and would remain
in the area until settlements for the Palestine and Canal questions were reached. Thus, Pearson
pressed the view that the force should remain in the region while a political settlement was
worked out, hoping to move directly from a cease-fire to a negotiation process.53 Dixon and
Ambassador Leslie Munro of New Zealand argued that the Anglo-French troops could not
withdraw from Egypt until the international force was firmly in place, on account that EgyptIsraeli violence could again break out and threaten the Canal.54
Over the course of the meeting, however, the arguments of Britain and its allies were
countered by the small powers, which echoed the Secretary-General in urging strict limitations
on the functions and scope of the force. Two problems with the British interpretation emerged:
first, that the international force would be authorized to remain in Egypt indefinitely, until a
political settlement was reached; and second, that the Anglo-French force would not withdraw
from Egyptian territory until after the international force was established. In regard to the first
problem, a force whose mission was to provide security during political negotiations could too
easily become “an instrument, directly or indirectly, for the accomplishment of political
objectives of the parties [Britain and France] to the controversy in the area.”55 The smaller
powers feared that any objective of the international force other than the restoration of the status
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quo ante would entail gains for Britain, France, and Israel, thereby legitimating aggression as a
means to achieving political objectives.56
The view of a force with narrow objectives was supported by the basic legal framework
established by the Assembly’s resolutions and confirmed in the Secretary-General’s report:
“A closer analysis of the concept of the United Nations force, based on what the General
Assembly has stated in its resolution on the matter [Resolution 998] indicates that the
Assembly intends that the force should be of a temporary nature, the length of its
assignment being determined by the needs arising out of the present conflict… By the
establishment of the force, therefore, the General Assembly has not taken a stand in
relation to aims other than those clearly and fully indicated in [Resolution 997].”57
Paragraph 12 of the report, on “Questions of Functions,” also explicated that the force would
have no rights outside the terms of Resolution 997.58 The delegate from Sweden argued that as
Resolution 997 did not discuss a political settlement to the Suez question, it followed that the
Force should not remain in Egypt “pending the solution of political problems affecting that
area.”59
The smaller powers further maintained that an operation established on the premise of the
contingent withdrawal of the Anglo-French force would violate the sovereign rights of Egypt.
These countries emphasized that British and French possessed no legal right to their presence on
Egyptian territory, regardless of whether a peacekeeping force had been established.60 Despite
the burgeoning power of the Assembly, which in effect found itself in the process of creating its
own legal regime, the majority of the small powers remained focused on the sovereign rights of
Egypt.
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However, while the smaller powers could press the notion of a narrowly-conceived force
against the more expansive claims of the British block, their arguments ultimately clashed with
the reality of the Anglo-French-Israeli presence at Sinai. The invading powers refused to
withdraw immediately on the demands of the Assembly, as Eden did not take seriously the
Soviet military threat and wished to complete the operation that had been begun.61
Hammarskjöld had sent letters to all four parties to the conflict immediately following the
passing of Resolution 999,62 urging them to implement a cease-fire within twelve hours, but as of
the deadline he had received a reply only from the government of Egypt, which accepted a ceasefire on the condition that it was recognized by the other powers. On November 5 the
governments of Britain and France sent letters to Hammarskjöld, stating that their militaries
would continue to operate in Egypt with “strictly limited objectives” until both Egypt and Israel
expressed their willingness to accept an international peacekeeping force.63 Following a run on
sterling, the British Cabinet finally agreed to a cease-fire on midnight of November 6-7, the only
condition on which the U.S. government would support an IMF loan.64 France followed suit,65
but the three invading powers remained on Egyptian territory with no a commitment to
withdraw.
The intransigence of Britain, France and Israel posed a significant obstacle to the creation
of a peacekeeping force. On the one hand, the stated purpose of the force was to “secure and
supervise the cessation of hostilities,”66 namely by ensuring the withdrawal of the British and
French from Egypt and the withdrawal of the Egyptian and Israeli forces behind the armistice
61
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lines. However, neither the Assembly nor any peacekeeping force created under its auspices
possessed the Chapter VII authority to force the invading powers to withdraw from Egypt. The
smaller powers differed widely in their approaches to this problem. The delegate from Brazil
ascribed to Pearson’s view that the invading powers should not be expected to withdraw from
Egypt until the international force had been established on the ground. The delegate from
Denmark recommended proceeding with the establishment of the force, relying on the good faith
of the powers that they would withdraw as soon as they were able. The Arab-Asia block argued
that the international force should not be deployed until after the United Nations had received the
“immediate and unconditional assurance”67 from Israel that it would comply with the Assembly
resolutions. Ultimately, however, the Arab-Asia position was untenable; given the limitations of
the Assembly’s legal authority, Hammarskjöld chose to proceed with the creation of the force,
without a promise of Anglo-French-Israeli withdrawal, and the Arab-Asia bloc tacitly acquiesced
to this reality in its acceptance of the enabling resolutions.
Despite the sharp disagreement over the role of the force, the necessity of a peacekeeping
operation itself was widely accepted among Assembly members, evident in the near unanimous
adoption of Resolutions 1000 and 1001. The idea of a quasi-military operation authorized by the
Assembly was only called into question once, by Ambassador Kuzentov of the Soviet Union,
who disputed the legality of the operation on two grounds. First, only the Security Council, under
Chapter VII, had the authority to organize any type of military force for the maintenance of
international security; and second, the only legitimate type of UN force, under Chapter VII, was
one that would intervene to defend a Member State against external aggression.68 That no
delegate answered Kuzentov’s objection signifies the one point on which nearly all of the
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Member States agreed. Such a literal reading of the Charter could not stand in the way of
immediate and effective action, necessary to restore the prestige of the United Nations; acting
outside the letter of the Charter was acceptable, so long as the Assembly did not act directly in
conflict with its provisions. No nation had objected when Hammarskjöld spoke of the legal
situation “created” by the General Assembly [my italics].69 It was futile for the Soviet delegate
to object to the legality of the law created by the Assembly after political necessity and majority
opinion had concurred in this process.
Ultimately, the Emergency Session established the rudimentary outlines of the future
peacekeeping operation and established the basic parameters for the debate over its functions.
Due primary to clashing political interests, the Member States had not arrived at conclusive
answers on most of the critical questions by the time the session closed on November 10. The
force was approved by a wide majority of Member States in view of the urgency of the matter.
The language of the resolutions--for example, that a peacekeeping operation should be set up
with “the consent of the nations concerned”70 or that the aggressors should withdraw from Egypt
“immediately”71--was sufficiently vague that states of varying political interests could vote in
favor of the measures based on their own preferred interpretations. Questions about the meaning
of “consent” and “territorial sovereignty” within the context of an international peacekeeping
mission would again be raised during the Secretary-General’s negotiations with the government
of Egypt, when a clearer understanding of the role of a peacekeeping operation would be
reached.
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4. Negotiations with Egypt
With the acceptance of Resolution 1001, the basic principles on which the UNEF would
be created had been confirmed. The UNEF was to function as a buffer force that would “ensure
compliance” with the terms of Resolution 997, without military or political objectives, and its
presence depended on the consent of Egypt.72 However, the government of Egypt requested
clarification on certain points before it would accept an international force on its territory, and
after Resolution 1001 was passed, Hammarskjöld and Burns engaged in a week of intensive
negotiations with Egyptian officials. The Secretary’s primary goal during these negotiations was
to establish a sufficiently strong relationship with the government of Egypt such that the first
contingencies of UNEF troops could be deployed as soon as possible. He discounted broad
principles in favor of setting up a force that could actually prove effective in securing the
withdrawal of the non-Egyptian troops and providing a basis for peace in the region.
The central problem encountered during the first round of negotiations was to define the
Egyptian “consent” which, according to the Secretary-General’s second report, was to serve as
the basis for the stationing and operation of a UN force in Egypt.73 It was unclear what “consent”
would mean in a situation in which foreign troops were to operate on the territory of a sovereign
nation, if these troops were not to become subsumed into that country’s own army or to fight
against it. Over the course of the negotiations, Hammarskjöld did not arrive at a general
definition of “consent,” but rather reached a series of practical arrangements with Egypt such
that the first troops of UNEF could be deployed by November 15.
The first question to arise was whether UNEF would have any functions in the Port Said
area, around the Suez Canal, after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces. On November 9
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Nasser expressed his fear that after the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces, UNEF might
occupy part of the Canal zone “to allow the internationalization of the Canal,” hence serving as
an instrument of British policy.74 His concern was augmented by paragraph 4 of the Assembly’s
Resolution 997, which urged that “steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure
freedom of navigation.”75 However, Hammarskjöld reassured the government of Egypt that the
functions of the force would remain limited to the supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal.
His own report on UNEF, which had been confirmed by the Assembly as the basis for the force,
only referred to these two functions,76 while the Assembly’s initial resolution on November 2
had been drafted before the idea of an international force had been discussed. UNEF would
always patrol the border between Egypt and Israel, and when that border shifted from the Canal
region to the Armistice lines, the placement of UNEF would shift as well.77
A more contentious question centered on the authority to determine the composition of
the force. While the Assembly had given Hammarskjöld and Burns the authority to recruit
officers directly from Member States outside the permanent members of the Security Council,78
Nasser asserted that Egypt’s consent was required for every Member State that was to contribute
to the force, as an extension of Egypt’s consent for the presence of the force itself.79 Nasser
objected to the proposed participation of NATO members Denmark and Norway, and in
particular to the participation of Canada, a staunch British ally. Hammarskjöld continued to
assert in principle his legal right to determine the composition of the force, but he recognized
that in practice, a force whose contingents were not accepted by Egypt would not be politically
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tenable. Thus the Secretary-General wrote in an aide-memoir to Egyptian Foreign Minister
Mahmoud Fawzi that the he intended “to work out the composition on the basis of a negotiated
agreement with Egypt.”80 By November 12, Hammarskjöld and the government of Egypt had
agreed to the participation of Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, India, Indonesia,
and Yugoslavia,81 a group which represented a balanced set of perspectives on the Suez conflict.
The question of Canada was resolved when General Burns offered to deploy a non-infantry unit,
which was acceptable to the Egyptians.82
A final question regarding the definition of “consent” arose as to the length of UNEF’s
presence in Egypt. In a November 11 meeting with Hammarskjöld, the Egyptian delegate Omar
Loutfi maintained that as Egypt’s consent was required for the “entry and presence” of UNEF,
the force could be withdrawn at any time on Egypt’s demand.83 This extension of Egyptian
consent posed a problem for the Secretary-General, as it seemed contradictory to establish a
force charged by the Assembly to fulfill certain tasks, which could be withdrawn on Egypt’s
demand before those tasks were fulfilled. Hammarskjöld proposed a negotiation principle similar
to his solution to the question of composition: were Egypt and the UN unable to agree on
whether the tasks of UNEF had been completed, the Secretary-General would engage in
negotiations with Egypt to determine when the force could be withdrawn.84 When the Egyptian
government challenged that the requirement of such negotiations would compromise its
sovereign rights, the Secretary-General responded that constitutionally, Egypt retained the right
to demand the withdrawal of UNEF at any time. The Secretary-General retained only the
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absolute right to bring such a matter before the Assembly.85 However, Hammarskjöld maintained
that the idea of negotiations between Egypt and the UN should be asserted as a normative
principle, if UNEF was to fulfill its purpose.
The UNEF Advisory Committee, a group of seven nations established by Resolution
1001 to assist Hammarskjöld in the formation of the force, met for the first time on November
14, two days after Hammarskjöld formally announced that Egypt had accepted the presence of
UNEF on its territory. The debate in the meeting centered on the nature of Egyptian “consent”
and ultimately served to strengthen the Secretary-General’s position. As during the negotiations,
Hammarskjöld held that respect for Egyptian sovereignty must serve as the foundation for all
questions, and that any disagreement between Egypt and the UN would ideally be resolved
through negotiations. Hammarskjöld’s pragmatic position followed from his primary goal of
establishing an international force as a “fait accompli.”86 It would be impossible to resolve all
matters of principle in advance, let alone to foresee all those that may arise in the future;
Hammarskjöld believed it wiser to first establish a force on the ground, and then to resolve the
conditions for its presence through negotiations, once the realities of the situation became clear.
Hammarskjöld’s position was supported by the delegates from India and Ceylon. They insisted
that as UNEF had been set up by the Assembly for an ad hoc purpose, the force should be
established in consistence with its pragmatic aims. Overriding legal principles could only
develop over time, through negotiations between the UN and Egypt.87
Throughout the meeting Pearson remained opposed to Hammarskjöld’s position,
underscoring the difference in outlook of the principal creators of UNEF. Pearson expressed his
mistrust of the Egyptian government and his fear that were UNEF to fail, states in the future
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would not look to the UN to resolve security crises. He objected to Egypt’s asserted rights to
determine “all the powers and functions” of the force, to demand the withdrawal of the force at
any time, and to hold a veto power over any participating contingent. Once the government of
Egypt had accepted the Assembly resolutions which had established the force, Pearson argued, it
must also accept the right of the Assembly and the Secretary-General to organize a force
consistent with those resolutions, without seeking to interfere for its own political advantage.
Pearson further emphasized the “international character” of the force, in response to Nasser’s
objection that a Canadian contingent would sympathize with the British position.88 Legal scholar
Rosalyn Higgins argued that Pearson’s argument was the more reasonable: if Egypt had
consented to the entry of a force that was charged to fulfill specific functions, then it was
consistent to expect that Egypt consent to the presence of the force until those functions were
completed.89
Ultimately, however, Pearson’s desire to delimit boundaries on Egyptian authority was
not accepted by the Advisory Committee. Nasser remained skeptical about the idea of a neutral
international force, while international public opinion viewed Egypt a victim state. Moreover, the
Assembly resolutions and the stance generally adopted during the Assembly debates, which was
unequivocal as to the sovereign rights of Egypt, gave legal credence to the Egyptian position.90
Hammarskjöld’s negotiation principle served as a means of reconciling two opposing political
realities: that Egypt would continue to assert its rights over the control of UNEF, and that the
Assembly would need to maintain a certain authority so that the international force did not
become an Egyptian force staffed by foreigners, as Pearson worried.

88

Meeting of the Advisory Committee on UNEF, 14 November 1956, pp. 14-16, 20
Higgins 21
90
Meeting of the Advisory Committee on UNEF, 14 November 1956, pp. 1-2
89

Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010
Brandon Bloch, College ‘11

27

With the arrival of fifty Norwegian and forty-five Danish UNEF troops on November 15,
Hammarskjöld felt it necessary to personally visit Egypt, both to demonstrate his good faith and
to discuss unresolved issues. Aware of the novel character of the first “truly international force”
in human history, Hammarskjöld wanted to ensure that the deployment of the force proceeded
smoothly.91
Hammarskjöld remained in Egypt from the 16th until the 18th of November. His talks
with representatives of the government of Egypt resolved few matters of principle; in fact, the
Secretary-General produced a text listing many critical points, including the composition of the
force and the area to be covered by the force after Israeli withdrawal, as matters to be left for
future negotiations.92 The only real principle agreed upon was that the UNEF “cannot stay nor
operate unless Egypt continues its consent,” essentially a formalization of the tenet
Hammarskjöld had recognized during the first round of negotiations with Egypt.93
The Secretary-General had never intended to come to a concrete legal arrangement with
Egypt. Rather, he believed that “moral and political forces” would ultimately determine the
success of UNEF and that it was most critical to strengthen the relationship between the UN and
Egypt. On November 19, Hammarskjöld presented to the Advisory Committee an “AideMemoire on the Basis for the Presence and Functioning of UNEF in Egypt” which he had
arranged with Egypt during his visit. The “good faith” agreement, as it has subsequently become
known, was approved by the Assembly on November 24 and served as the basis for the presence
of UNEF in Egypt until a more concrete legal regime was arrived at in February.94 The
agreement held that in all matters “concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF,” Egypt
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would be guided “in good faith” by its acceptance of the Assembly resolutions that had
established the force; similarly, the UN would be guided “in good faith” by the tasks assigned to
the force by the Assembly resolutions. Most importantly, the UN and Egypt would “explore
jointly” the logistical aspects of the operation and would implement the guiding principles of the
Assembly resolutions.95
The “good faith” agreement represents the culmination of Hammarskjöld’s pragmatic
diplomacy during the initial phase of the Suez crisis. It would not have been politically feasible
for Hammarskjöld to force the government of Egypt to accept specific logistical arrangements
without prior consultation, as it would have been antithetical to the neutral character of the
mission for Egypt itself to direct the operation. The “good faith” agreement represented a viable
middle ground between these extremes, as neither Egypt nor the Assembly could unilaterally
impose its own terms, and both would seek to resolve areas of tension with an understanding of
the other’s good will.

5. Conclusions
Hammarskjöld’s vigorous response to the challenges of the Suez crisis brought to fruition
a novel model for international peacekeeping, which would prove of great significance in the
subsequent history of the UN. Through two weeks of intensive negotiations, we see a series of
foundational principles emerge in response to the tensions of the early Cold War: the
noninvolvement of the Great Powers from the mutual fear of the United States and the Soviet
Union of the other’s participation in the force; the concept of a neutral force, not contingent on a
political settlement, from protracted debates within the General Assembly ultimately resolved in
accordance with the view of the United States; and the principle of the “consent” of the host
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country from the clashing demands of Pearson and the Egyptian government, ultimately resolved
through Hammarskjöld’s diplomacy. These principles remained ambiguous even upon the arrival
of the first troops, but the good faith established between Egypt and the United Nations would
serve to guide UNEF as it evolved over the following months. The support of the international
community remained behind the innovative paradigm, which had steered the world from a
potential Great Power confrontation and had brought at least a temporary peace following one of
the most precarious conflicts since the Second World War.
The imperative for a firmer legal basis for peacekeeping was not forgotten, even after the
remarkable experience of UNEF. Pearson remained concerned that such a pragmatic ad hoc
success might be difficult to repeat, and thus he proposed that the UN develop an “organized and
permanent” mechanism for peacekeeping to be applied in future conflict situations. He feared
that without such a system countries would look to regional security organizations, dominated by
the political interests of the Great Powers, for protection against aggressors, and thereby the
United Nations would become defunct. However, the more permanent peacekeeping framework
Pearson proposed mirrored the structure of UNEF, attesting to the precedential nature of the
principles established during the Suez crisis despite that they arose in response to a specific
political situation. Thus, Pearson proposed that non-permanent Member States be asked in
advance whether they would provide a military contingent for a future peacekeeping force,
upholding the principle of the non-involvement of the Great Powers. He proposed that a general
agreement on the “financial, administrative, and legal procedures” of a Peace Supervision Force
be drawn up consistently with the principle of consent; consent for the force would be
determined by agreement between the Secretary-General and the host country. Finally, Pearson
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suggested that in any future peacekeeping operation the Secretary-General be provided with an
Advisory Committee and a Military Advisor, mimicking the structure of UNEF.96
Ultimately, it was Hammarskjöld’s remarkable ability to balance the competing demands
of the three major blocs that ensured the successful establishment of UNEF; Pearson’s vision of
a rigorous set of principles was not realized, and the rules that would govern the mission
emerged in response to Hammarskjöld’s diplomatic calculations. However it is not a mere
coincidence that the model derived ad hoc during the Suez crisis established a precedent for
many future peacekeeping operations. The framework for peacekeeping created a paradigm that
responded to the political realities of the Cold War and allowed a viable, albeit limited, security
role for the international body, despite the antagonism of its two most powerful members. UNEF
maintained the support of the United States and the Soviet Union, which enabled the UN to act in
the preservation of international security so long as their own interests were not affected.
Moreover, UNEF was founded on the principle of respect for the sovereignty of the host state,
thereby avoiding an invasive military operation which could not win the combined support of the
Great Powers and would endanger an escalation of the conflict. Peacekeeping operations
diverged from the collective security envisioned by the Charter’s framers, and they did not bring
about final political resolutions to international disputes; but within the limitations imposed by
Cold War, they could monitor a cease-fire and provide a significant moral force against a further
escalation of violence. In successfully balancing Cold War tensions within the context of the
Suez crisis, Hammarskjöld ultimately created a model that could remain viable given the broader
security concerns and political instabilities of the time.
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